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NAPOLEON'S INVASION OF RUSSIA 
0 F ALL the wars Napoleon waged, the War of 1812 was the most avowedly imperialistic, and was most directly 
dictated by the interests of the French financiers and big 
capitalists. a 
For Russia this was a war for the preservation of her eco- 
nomic and political independence; a war to save herself not 
only from the ruin threatened 'as a result of Napoleon's 
blockade policy, which hindered Russian trade with England, 
but also from dismemberment, for the Poles were hoping, with 
the aid of the French Emperor to secure Lithuania and Byelo- 
russia, and even to reach the Black Sea. Hence, as far as 
Russia was concerned, the War of 1812 was in the fullest sense 
a fight for existence; a war of .defense against a predatory im- 
perialist invasion. This accounts for the nationwide character 
of the great struggle that the Russian people then waged so 
heroically against the world conqueror. 
Diplomats began to discuss the possibility of such a war in 
the beginning of 1810, but the seeds of it were sown some time 
before that. 
' On December 2, 1805, Napoleon inflicted a severe defeat on 
the Austrian and Russian forces at Austerlitz. In this battle 
the French could clearly see the difference between the fighting 
qualities of the Russian soldiers and those of the less stalwart 
and less courageous Austrians. In 1807 the Russian troop, 
which the Tsar had sent to save Prussia from utter subjuga- 
tion, fought against Napoleon's forces first in the sanguinary 
but indecisive battle of Eylau on February 8, and then in the 
battle of Friedland on June 14, which ended in a victory for 
Napoleon. This battle was followed by the conclusion of the 
Treaty of Tilsit, by which Alexander I entered into an alli- 
ance with' Napoleon and joined the so-called "continental 
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blockade." This meant that Russia pledged herself not to 
vade with England3 to permit no Englishmen to enter Russia, 
an'' to declare war on England. Napoleon bad insisted on 
these terms in order to bring England to her knees, but their 
operation greatly damaged the interests of the Russian land- 
owners and merchants. Russian trade dwindled, and the state 
finances of Russia were reduced to low ebb. 
Later, however, the situation changed. The annexation of 
Holland by France in June, 1810; the transfer of three French 
divisions from the south of Germany to the Baltic coast in 
.August of that year; and the dispatch from France of fifty 
thousand muskets to the Duchy of Warsaw-the Polish state 
created by Napoleon and headed by the King of Saxony- 
were all portentous signs of another approaching storm. Rus- 
sian diplomats attributed these events to Napoleon's "Austrian 
marriage" (with' Marie-Louise, daughter of the Austrian Em- 
peror) zind to his alliance with Austria. Napoleon no longer 
nekaed R ~ s i a ;  his power in Europe had found a new prop in 
Vienna. From that time onward relations between Napoleon 
and Alexandei 'I be&e very : strained. 
- In 'the beginning of 18 i$ ~ & ~ 0 1 e 0 n  succeeded in concluding 
a military alliance with Prussi'a and . Austria against Russia. 
During an abdience granted him by Napoleon on April 27, 
Prince KuraBin, Russian ahbassador in Paris, requested that 
the French t m p s  be withdrawn from Prussia. He also drew 
attent'ion to Napoleon's. coldssd armaments and to his "alli- 
ance" with Prussia,' whi& wis 06viously leveled 'against 
Russia. Napoleon either did not listen and went on talking 
about something else, .or' else kept repeating an emphatic 
-refusal. Next day Kurakin visited Hugues-Bernard Maret, 
Duke of Bassano, the ~rench"~inister of Foreign Affairs, and 
informed him that while Russia was prepared to yield on 
most of -the points at issue, she stili insisted on the withdrawal 
of the Frefich troops from Prussia and on Russia's right. .to 
trade with neutral countries. - 
Napoleon was highly incensed at this demand for the with- 
drawal of the troops from Prussia and called it an insolent 
  ultimatum,^" which he clutched at as pro06 that not he but 
the ~ s a r  had become aggressive. 
War seemed imminent. The majority of diplomats in 
Europe believed that if war did break out Napoleon would be 
victorious; but certain signs w&e visible that many food 
for reflection. 
Fint of all there was Spain. ,Napoleon's position there was 
very precarious. The country was seething with revolt and he 
had to maintain there an army of over zoo,ooo (twice the size 
of the army he subsequently had at Borodino) and even that 
was in constant need of r~inforcernents owing to th6 heavy 
losses it SUE ered. 
The second circumstance that eased Russia's position was 
the sudden change in Sweden's policy.' Bernadotte, one of 
Napoleon's marshals, had been elected Heir Apparent to the 
Swedish throne; but as soon as Bernadotte appeared in Sweden 
he began to seek a rapprochement with Alexander. In this he 
was encouraged by a considerable section of the Swedish aris- 
tocracy, which was enraged by Napoleon's tyranny in depriv- 
ing Sweden of what was called Swedish Pomerania by a mere 
stroke of the pen. Furthermore, Alexander promised to help 
Sweden to acquire Norway. 
' The third factor that was in Russia's favor was the con- 
clusion of peace -with Turkey. The peace treaty signed by 
Marshal Kutuzov in Bucharest on May 22 was rather favor- 
able for Russia, and the cessation of the Russo-Turkish war 
released 80,ooo to ' 40,000 Russian soldiers for service else- 
where if the contingency arose. 
Such were the relatively favorable circumstances that gave 
grounds for the hope that Russia would be able successfully 
to defend herself against her formidable enemy. Nevertheless, 
consternation reigned at the Court and among the higher 
aristocracy in St. Petersburg. 
On May 9, 1812, Napoleon set out for Dresden, ostensibly 
for the purpose of reviewing the Grand Army on the Vistula. 
It was common knowledge, however, that he was setting out 
on a war against Russia. 
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His triumphant progress through Germany and the endless 
columns of troops he passed on the way streaming toward the 
East made him feel that he was indeed the dictator of the con- 
tinent of Europe. The King and Queen of Saxony traveled a 
long way out of Dresden 'to meet him. In Dresden the 
~ustr ian-  Emperor Franz I and his consort arrived to pay 
homage to their august son-in-law; and the King of Prussia 
asked-for Napoleon's special permission to present himself at 
Dresden to do the same. This gathering of vassal monarchs 
and the solemnities attending it were nothing more nor less 
than an anti-Russian demonstration. Here, too, Napoleon re- 
ceived Count Narbonne, who arrived post-haste from Vilna to - 
report to him. 
Taking farewell of his crowned vassals, and leaving Marie- 
Louise and the whole Court at Dresden, Napoleon set out to 
meet the Grand Army, which was marching in several columns 
toward the Niemen River. At dawn on June 21 he arrived in 
the village of Vilkovishko, several miles from the Niemen. On 
June 22 he ordered the army to advance to the river. 
In none of his previous campaigns had Napoleon been so 
conscious of the uncertainty of the outcome of his undertaking 
as he was in this one. But when he saw these countless ranks 
marching in all their splendor to the Niemen, even the un- 
known seemed to beckon to him. In a confidential conversa- 
tion he had with Count Narbonne he said: 
"We will now march to Moscow, but why not turn from 
Moscow to India? Let no one tell Napoleon that India is far 
from MOSCOW. Alexander of Macedonia did not find Greece 
very near to India, but that did not deter him. He reached 
the Ganges from a place that was no less distant than Moscow 
. . . and it is s~~fficient to touch the Ganges with a French 
sword to cause the edifice of England's mercantile magnifi- 
cence to collapse." 
Does this mean that the main objects of the war that 
Napoleon was now embarking on were Moscow and India? 
Oh, no! Publicly, Napoleon stated that the Tsar had com- 
b pelled him to go to war by his "ultimatum" (concerning the 
withdraw of the French troops from Prussia); that the object 
of the war was to bring the Tsar to reason and to forestall all 
possibility 01 his rapprochement with England; that this war 
was purely "political," it was being undertaken with a definite 
political object, .and as noon as this w a s  achieved he would 
' 
be ready to mak'e gkd. Cag&g that  he Eaq~r+r him- 
did stat .JLZKBW . e y  -d ;ihls p ~ p ~  W% is .it ,sUrPr3s-
i.qp&em2W- &e * G d  Amy, -from -the nts$shals right -dawn 
to the lowest army cook, did not know why it was being led 
to Russia? , 
On taking up his quarters in the manor house in Vilko- 
vishko Napoleon, -on June 22, issued a proclamation to the 
Grand Army saying: "We shall advance, cross the Niemen and . 
lead the troops into her r[Russia's] territory. . . ." This was, in 
effect, Napoleon's declaration of war, for he made no other 
declaration. On June 23 Napoleon inspected, the bank-of the 
river. Three bridges were being buiIt, the last of which .tias 
completed by midnight. There was a fourth bridge at Kovno, . 
which could also be used far crossing the river. 
On the night of June 23, iB ia , .  Napoleon issued the ~rder  
to his army toto' cross,the ~ i e m e n .  The die was cast. 
THE OPENING OF HOSTILITIES, AND THE 
RETREAT OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY 
. . 
LEXANDER learned' that - Napoleon had crossed the A Russian frontier late at night on June 24, while at a ball 
given in .his honor in Vilna. Next day 'he instructed Lieuten- 
ant-General . Balashbv, , his Minister fot the Interior,: to take a. 
written message to ~ a ~ o l e o n ,  and also to tell him verbally 
that "if he [Napoleon] desirid to enter into negotiations they 
could'be opened f'orthwith; but on one essential conditiofi- 
that he withdrawsc his army beyond the frontier.".. "His 
Majesty pledged his word that he would neither utter nor 
listen to a word about -peace as long as a single .armed '~Cench 
man remained in Russia." . 
'on Juae soF Bdashov had two interviews with Napoleon, 
in the course of which the latter said that he had not intended. 
to make war on Russia and that, in fact, he had been on the 
point of sending his pemnd belongings to. Spain, where he 
' had intended to go. 
"I know;" he said, "that a war between -France and Russia 
is no bagatelle either for France or Russia. I have made great 
preparations and my forces are three times as large as yours. 
I know as well as you, perhaps even better, how many troops 
you have. You have 130,000 infantry and 60,ooo to 70,ooo 
cavalry. In short, less than 200,000. I have three times that 
number.: Then he complained that Alexander had departed 
from his Tilsit policy of friendship with him and had thereby 
''mimed his reign." 
Balashov returned to Alexander and reported his conversa- 
tion with Napoleon. Alexander had no alternative but to 
aotept Napoleon's challenge, and on July 13 he issued a 
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prodamation to the army announcing Napoleon's invasion 
and the opening of hostilities. 
I 
When news was received that Napoleon was advancing 
straight from the Niemen to Vilna, and that Murat, King of 
Naples, and his cavalry were in the vanguard, the Russian 
Command decided to retreat from Vilna to the "fortified 
camp" at Drissa. This camp had been built in accordance 
with the plans of General Phull, a member of the Tsar's 
suite. 
General Phull was regarded as a military expert, and at the 
beginning of every campaign he drew up very extensive and 
detailed plans, which, however, usually ended in smoke. He 
began his career in the Prussian army, but he proved a failure 
there and entered the Russian service. In-St. Petersburg he acted 
as military tutor to Alexander I. The latter believed that he 
was a genius and always took his advice. Without consulting 
either Barday de Tolly or Prince Bagration, his two foremost 
generals, Alexander had ordered the erection of this "fortified 
camp" near the village of Drissa, on the Dvina. Situated as it 
was between two highroads, Phull imagined that Pt could serve 
as a barrier to Napoleon's advance on both St. Petersburg 
- and Moscow. 
1 When the army, with the Tsar and Barclay de Tolly at its 
head, arrived at Drissa, the generals were horrified. "Only a 
lunatic or a traitor could have invented the.Drissa camp," 
categorically declared some of the bolder of them in Alex- 
ander's presence. The Drissa camp, with its fictitious "fortifica- 
tions," they said, would not hold out even a couple of days, 
and the Russian army would be in danger of being surrounded 
and forced' into a shameful capitulation. 
In crossing the Niemen, Napoleon believed that the Russian 
army immediately in front of him numbered about 200,000 
men. He was wrong. .4ctualli, leavini i t - ~ e n e r a r  ~ormasov's 
southern Army, which was 'facing the Austrian * Corps c6m- 
manded by Schwanexiberg, on the day o f  Napoleon's in- 
v$on,.' the-Russian Conhinand had the'folldi\ting' .£&cei at its 
-diipcmlr thk First A*?; command2d by ~ a r c l a f a i  Tolly, 
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118,000 men; -and the Second Army, commanded by Bagration, 
35,060 men; making a total of igg,ooo. In- the course of the 
retreat this army received reinforcements; nevertheless, when, 
later on, Barclay de Tolly and Bagration joined forces in 
Smolensk, they had no more than i~g,ooo men at their dis- - 
posal. Sickness and casualties in fighting had reduced their : 
numbers. 
.Thez- possessed 'adequate artillery .and good 
. gunneb. It may be said that at no time in the first half of the 
nineteenth century was the Russian artillery so well matched 
.with the French as it was in 1812, 1813 and 1814. At the time , 
Napoleon crossed the Niemen the Russian troops were, rela- 
tively speaking, better supplied with artillery than Napoleon's 
army. The Russian army had approximately seven guns per 
thousand men, whereas the ratio in Napoleon's army was no 
higher than four per thousand. The absolute number- of guns, 
of course, was higher in Napoleon's army, for the simple reason 
that at the opening of hostilities his army was far larger than 
the Russian. 
Barclay de ~ 0 1 1 ~  left Vilna for the Drissa camp on June 26 
and arrived there on July lo with an army of ioo,ooo men. 
On July 16 he left the camp with all his troops, his baggage 
and supplies, and with the Tsar himself, and marched in thc 
direction of Vitebsk. For ten weary days de Tolly marched , 
from Drissa through Polotsk to Vitebsk in the sultry July heat, 
and on the way he received reports from his spies and scouts 
that Napoleon with his main force was also marching toward 
that town. He knew that Napoleon would arrive at Vitebsk 
with 200,000 men, whereas he would have barely 75,000 men. 
for he was compelled to allocate 25,000 men-one-fourth of his 
forces-to reinforce Count Wittgenstein, who was guarding the 
road to St. Petersburg. 
In the first, and for Russia the most dangerous, period of 
the war, the Prussian generals, whose forces formed part of the 
French army corps commanded by Marshal Macdonald, ser- 
vilely carried out the behests of Napoleon. As a reward for 
their services they, like their pious sovereign Frederick William 
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111, hoped to received a large slice of Russian territory-the 
whole of the Baltic Region. At first the Russians thought that 
the Prussians were only pretending to take an active part in 
the war in order to placate Napoleon, and would not seriously 
fight against Russia. But to their surprise they found that they 
were mistaken, The Prussians not only conscientiously killed 
Russian soldiers, but zealously looted the region they occupied 
-"made a clean sweep of it," as an eye-witness put it. Later, 
when Napoleon had barely left Russia, they swung over to the 
side of R d a .  
On July go Wittgenstein fought a successful engagement 
against Marshal Oudinot, Duke of Reggio, and pushed him 
back to Polotsk. 
De Tolly and Bagration, hard pressed by the enemy, re- 
treated on Vitebsk and Moghilev in the frightful heat, their 
troops half-starving and going without fresh water for several 
days on end. Only an hour after the retreat of the Russian 
troops from Vilna did Napoleon arrive there with his van- 
guard. Here he stayed from June 08 to July 16. 
Quite early in July Napoleon was able to experience all the 
inconveniences of the continental climate and the lack off 
roads in Russia. The frightful heat was followed by heavy 
rains, which made the movement of troops extremely difficult. 
Sickness thinned the ranks of Napoleon's army in the very 
first days of the campaign. 
Worst of all, however, were the unexpected *difficulties that 
arose in connection with the supply of food and fodder. The 
baggage trains could not keep up with the rapidly advancing 
army, and as a result men and horses were deprived of their 
regular rations. Driven by hunger, the men began to plunder 
the inhabitants, even while they were still marching through 
the territory of Napoleon's "ally," Prussia. But\ in none of 
Napoleon's campaigns, except the I talian campaign of 1796-97 
and the Egyptian campaign of 1798-99, was looting conducted 
on the scale and intensity that it was in the regions occupied 
in Russia in 18 I P. The discipline of the Grand Army in no 
way resembled the traditional discipline of Napoleon's troops. 
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It did not consist of volunteers, as was the case with previous 
armies, nor was it a purely 'French army. Its men were drawn 
from numerous nationalities jrom at1 over Europe. 
While in Vilna Napoleon had to draw up two plans of 
operation; one against Bagration, who with the Second Army 
was retreating toward Nesvkh, and the other against de Tolly, 
who on June 26 had left Vilna with the First Army in the 
direction of the Drissa camp. 
Bagration's position seemed desperate. He had in all about 
40,000 men, for at the very beginning of the retreat two 
divisions were thrown back to Volyn. He was being pur- 
sued by Marshal Davout with an army of 70,000 men; by 
Yoniatowski with an army of 35,000 men; by Jerome, King of 
Westphalia, and brother of Napoleon, with an army of 16,000 
men; by Grouchy with 7,000 men; and by General Latour- 
Maubourg with 8,000 men. Nevertheless, he got away. Napo- 
leon was furious with his incompetent brother for failing to 
overtake and defeat Bagration. 
On July 8, Marshal Davout occupied Minsk and thence 
marched to the River Berezina. Again Bagration found him- 
-self in a critical situation. He retreated' with his army strung 
out along the narrow roads between the marshes. When 
Napoleon heard of the position of Bagration's army he ex- 
claimed: "I've caught himJ" Evidently, he <forgot at that 
moment that he himself had called Bagration the best general 
in the Russian army. Davout stayed in Minsk four days. By a 
skillful maneuver Bagration turned sharply to the south, 
reached the Berezina near the town of Bobruysk, crossed the 
river 'at this point, and marched toward the Dnieper. Ordering 
Rayevski to hold up Davout's forces near the village of 
Dashkovka, he himself marched to Novy Bykhov, at which 
point he crossed the Dnieper on July 25. Another part of his 
army crossed the river at Stary Bykhov. 
On July 23, Rayevsky, with but one army corps, held out 
for ten hours in a stubborn battle at Dashkovka against five 
divisions from the m y  corps of Marshals Davouf and Mor- 
tier, who were pressing him very hard. At one critical moment 
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I in the battle the musketeers, subjected to a hail of bhllets, wavered. It was said and written at the time that Rayevsky in a ffash seized both his sons by the arms, rushed forward 
with them, rallied the men and-led them in a charge. The men 
proved worthy of their gallant commander. ' ~ a y e v s k ~  was 
never lavish with praise, hut in the dispatch he sent to his 
superior, Bagration, - after the battle, he wrote: "I myself saw 
many officers* and privates who had been twice wounded 
: bandaging their wounds and returning to the battle as if to a 
bean feast. I cannot sufficiently express my admiration for the 
courage and skill of the Artillerymen. All were lieroes to 
a man.", 
. Bagration extricated himself from the ~rench pincers by 
:, crossing to the left bank of the Dnieper. Marshal Davout 
"earned that Bagration had crossed' the Dnieper twenty-four 
hours after the event and immediately reported this to Napo- 
leon. This news, too, displeased the Emperor very much. 
To hold up the French advance, de Tolly sent against them 
the 4th Infantry Corps, commanded by Count Osteman- ' 
I Tolstoy, and followed this up with reinforcements commanded 
: by General Konovnitsin. The road from Ostrovno to the 
Luchosa River was lined with the dead bodies of these two 
forces but they fulfilled the task they had been sent to per- 
form. They gave de Tolly and Bagration two extra days in 
: which to draw up their plans. 
On July 27, just before dawn, a courier arrived at de Tolly's 
camp with a message from Bagration, who reported that he 
had failed to fight his way to Moghilev and that he had 
learned that Davout was starting out on a march on 
Smolensk. 
Several hours before receiving this dispatch from Bagration 
de Tolly had received a report that Napoleon himself had 
suddenly arrived at Vitebsk with the Old Guard. From the 
Russian camp, fires could be seen -burning in the encamp 
ments of the French Guards on the outskirts of the forest near 
Vitebsk. A quick decision had to be made. To give Napoleon 
battle, and without Bagration's assistance at that, meant al- 
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most certain defeat and, consequently,' the destruction of the 
Russian army. De Tally decided to'retreat from Vitebsk to 
Smolensk and to leave a csvering force of 3,000 infantry, 4,000 
cavalry and 40 guns, under the command .of Count Pahlen, 
about five versts from Vitebsk, to hold up Napoleon even for 
a short time if the latter decided to advance from Vitebsk to 
Smolensk immediately. On the night of July 27 the Russian 
* army quietly, and in complete darkness, stquck camp and 
departed. 
Napoleon was so eager to fight a general engagement at 
Vitebsk that while still on the march to that town he had 
ordered Murat, King of Naples, and Prince Eughne, Viceroy 
of Italy, to place no obstacles in the way of the different units 
'of the Russian army joining the main Russian forces. 
On July 25 the French advanced on 'Vitebsk. The sultry 
heat continued. The soldiers marched amidst "scorching dust," 
which brought back to the minds of the veterans of the Grand 
Army their campaigns 'in Egypt and in the Syrian deserts. 
Late at night, on the 26th,' the French advance columns 
arrived on the outskirts of the forest, on the edge of the plain 
on which Vitebsk stands. The Emperor gazed at the numerous 
camp fires in and around the town where the Russian army 
was stationed. What will de Tolly do, he reflected. Will he 
accept battle at 'Vitebsk? Will the morrow or the next day 
bring another Austerlitz which will edipse even the Austrian 
Austerlitz, where he had achieved victory over these very same - .  
Russians in 1805) 
Came the dawn of Julv 07. Troop movements continued in 
and around the city.   he Russians did not attack. Napoleon, 
on his part, decided to put off his attack to the next day. When 
the army had turned in for the night the Emperor informed 
Murat of his decision and instructed him to prepare for a 
general engagement to commence at 5 A.M. On the Russian 
side camp fires were burning just as they had been on the 
previous night. Napoleon went to his tent while Murat went 
to his cavalry outposts, which stood ' nearest of all to the 
Russian positions. q 
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. .At dawn a courier brqught Napoleon- a 'mess.age. from Murat 
informing. hkn. that in the nigha de Tolly had ,retreated from. 
Vitebsk. That meant that :de: Tolly must be pursued. and if 
possible defeated before he could join Bagration. If the two 
forces succeeded in uniting, then both must be defeated, ' 
In the beginning of August Napoleon informed his marshals 
that he intended to march on Smolensk. Murat was.entirely in 
favor of continuing the- pursuit of the Russian army, but 
Berthier, Duroc, Daru and Caulaincourt were emphatically 
opposed to launching another attack. Rarely did they dare to 
express their disagreemeqt with their sovereign as definitely 
and e'mphatically as they did on this occasion. Respectfully, 
but firmly, Marshal Duroc argued that the Russians were 
obviously enticing the Grand Army far into the country, where 
doom awaited it. He was backed by Berthier. Both marghals 
warned the Emperor about the frightful loss of horses, the 
shortage of forage, the dislocation of the food supply for the 
army, about the poverty-stricken character of the' country in 
which they were fighting and which, moreover, the Russians 
were deliberately devastating, the vast dimensions of the coun- 
try, and so forth. And Duroc drew the Emperor's attention 
particularly to the sinister fact that Alexander was not suing 
for peace. To all this Napoleon replied that he had calculated 
all the dangeq, but was sure that the campaign would end 
at Smolensk. . 
Nevertheless, for several days Napoleon issued ~o orders 
to the army either to move from Vitebsk, or to make prepam- 
tions for a long stay there. Although he had decided on his 
line of action, he dallied and seemed to be waiting for some 
impeps. 
The impetus came. On August 10, the Emperor received a 
report to the effect that General Sebastia~i had-suddenly been 
attacked by Russian cavalry near Inkov and had suffered severe 
losses. This revived the hope that the Russians had taken a 
stand somewhere on the left bank of the Dnieper. Napoleon 
immediately ordered the army to advance. .On August 13, the 
first units left Vitebsk. 
The conqueror entered Central Russia. Smolensk, which 
had so many times in past centuries blocked the road to the 
invader; the ancient city which had not seen a foe before its 
walls for two hundred years, made preparations to meet its 
most formidable enemy. But its walls and battlements wercb 
destined to collapse under blows such as it had never experi- 
enced before. 
I 
THE BATTLE OF SMOLENSK 
T AKING cover in the forests and performing intricate maneuvefs in order to conceal his line of march from the 
Russians, Napoleon tried to reach Smolensk in a series of rapid 
marches, but was held up by the stubborn resistance of the 
small force commanded by General Neverovsky. After being 
driven from the village of' Lad and then from the .village of 
Krasnoye, Neverovsky, heroically defending himself against 
- French forces at least five times superior to his own, retreated 
toward ~molensk. Count Sbgur, a member of Napoleon's en- 
tourage and an eye-witness, described this as a "lion's 
line of retreat was strewn with Russian bodies. Another French 
chronicler of this retreat wrote: 
The Russian soldiers showed utter contempt for 
"The Russian .horsemen, together with their horses; seemed 
to be rooted.to the ground. . . . A number of ~ u r  p eliminary 
attacks failed. . . . Each time the [retreating] Russians suddenly 
turned round .on us and threw us back with their musket & fire.'' 
. Bagration learned that Napoleoh had sent considerable 
' forces to ~orogobuzh, 'northeast of Smolensk, in' order to cut 
; the high-road to Moscow. He immediately advanced to 'fore- 
. stall this move. He had few troops at his command, but whqt 
, perturbed him most was the conviction that. de Tolly wofiId 
. surrender Smolensk. He- therefore ordered Rayevsky's corps to 
- march out of Smolensk' to- meet the advancilig French. Just at 
, that moment he received a dispatch from Neverovsky stating 
that on August -15 the French aarniy had attacked. his corpsat 
Krasnoye, that he was now making a fighting retreat, and was 
in need of imnhediate assistance. Assistance was sent, but it 
zimived too late. The remnants of Neverovsky's force were 
merged with that of Rayevsky's, which was 13,000 strong. 
That night Rayevsky and Never~vsky saw an endless lihe of 
cainp fires on theshorimn. This was Napoleon and his whole 
army encamping for the night, obviously in preparation for a 
march by direct route on Smolensk. It was not certain, how- 
ever, whether Napoleon would wait until the morning .or 
- suddenly strike camp and maich on the city in the middle 
of the night. 
Rayevsky had under his command a force of 'only q,ooo 
men, whereas at this moment Napoleon had a force of iB~,om. 
The main Russian army had already started on its retreat from 
Smolensk' to Moscow. Nevertheless, Rayevsky decided to de- 
fend himself. 
On the morning of August I 6, Napoleon was already before 
the walls of ~molensk. Rayevsky learned that Bagration was 
hastening to his assistance and expected to be in the vicinity 
of Smolensk by the evening. De Tolly was also marching 
toward the city. 
At 6 A.M. on August 16, Napoleon began to bombard - 
Smolensk, and soon after launched the first assault. The first 
line of defense was held by Rayevsky's division. The battle 
continued with varying intensity all day. But all Napoleon's 
efforts to capture the city that day failed. Night set in and 
both sides suspended operations in order to prepare for an- 
other stiff encounter .next day. At night, on de Tolly's orders, 
Rayevsky's corps, which had -suffere& enormous loss&, was re- 
lieved by the' corps commanded by Dokhturov. 
The battle before the walls of Smolensk whs resumed at 
4 A.M. on August 17 and from that time until 5 P.M.-for 
thirteen hours-an almost incessant artillery duel was fought. 
By 5 P.M. all the suburbs of Smolensk were in flames; 'even 
parts of the city itself were burning. Assault Mlowed assault, 
each pmceded by a heavy bombardment, but the Russian 
troops repulsed every attack. Night set in again, but the bom- 
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bardment and conflagration continued with greater intensity 
than ever. 
suddenly, at midnight, the Russian guns ceased fire and then 
followed explosions of incredible force. De Tolly had ordered 
hii army to blow up the powder magazine and to withdraw 
from the city. The Russian troops had been fighting with 
splendid spirit and did not in the least regard themselves as 
defeat& when the order to retreat was received; but de Tolly 
realized that Napoleon was trying to force him into a general 
engagement in order to achieve another Austerlitz on the 
banks of the Dnieper. Bagration, with part of the army, was 
still on the march to Dorogobuzh and would obviously arrive 
too late. For these reasons de Tolly decided to withdraw. 
At dawn on August 18 Napoleon woke up expecting a gen- 
eral engagement to take place, but his adjutants pointed across 
the river to the dense masses of troops marching eastward 
from Smolensk. He realized that de Tolly had again avoided 
battle and that the Russian command had used Smolensk 
merely as a screen to hold up his pursuit. Again the Russian 
army had slipped through his fingers. 
- .4t dawn on August ig Marshal Ney made a detour and1 
emerged to the east of ~molensk. On learning that the Russian 
army was retreating along the Moscow road he immediately 
went in pursuit. Near Valutino Hill he was held up by the 
Russian rearguard. A battle ensued which lasted the whole of 
that day. The Russians put up a stubborn resistance and in- 
flicted on the French losses amounting to 7,000 men. The 
Russians lost about 6,000. When dusk set in the artillery 
ceased fire. At night de Tolly withdrew from his positions and 
retreated eastward. Describing this battle, Count Skgur wrote 
that "the Russians covered themselves with almost as much 
glory in their defeat as we in our victory." 
This was an ominous sign for Napoleon. He had to ask 
himself: Had the Russians been put to flight at least once since 
the war began? Could the battle of Krasnoye and Neverovsky's 
retreat really be called a victory for the Grand Army? Had 
there been cases anywhere else, except in Spain, where individ- 
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ual men kept a wholevregiment at bay, and where it was neces- 
' sary to bring up cannon against individual soldiers surrounded 
by enemies, as was the case 'with a Russian chasseur ai. Smo- 
l e d ?  In fact, the battle of Valutino Hill should be regarded 
- not *as a victory but as a strategic defeat for the French grmy. 
Napoleon had sent General Junot's corps to make a detour 
, . around.Smolensk for ihe purpose of ireventing de Tolly and 
Bagration from joining forces on the Moscow road. But ~ u n o t  
' 
. arrived too late. When he crossed the marshes and emerged on 
the MOSCOW road the two Russian armies had joined and tvere. 
already marching toward Dorogobuzh. 
BORODINO 
0 N AUGUST 1 7  Mikhail Illarionovich Kutuzov was ap- pointed commander-in-chief of the Russian army. Kutu- 
zov's name was on everybody's lips not only among the aristoc- 
racy in St. Petersburg and Moscow, but also among the officers 
of the army, and even among the rank and file. Everybody 
knew that the Tsar detested Kutuzov and that the latter re- 
ciproated this sentiment but, in view of circumstances, the 
Tsar was obliged to thrust aside his personal antipathies. 
At the time Kutuzov received his new appointment he was 
67 years ~f age. His great predecessor Suvorov hadJappraised 
him far higher than many other of his officers. "He is very 
shrewd, and very clever! Nobody can fool him!" Suvorov used 
to say of him. The aged gelieral was distinguished for his great 
talents as a strategist, his cool, indomitable courage, his great 
military experience, aqd his wide popularity among the peo- 
ple and the army. In this war he counted on the fact that the 
Russian peasants would rather burn their grain, hay and 
houses than sell provisions and forage to the enemy, and that 
in this seared desert the enemy would meet his doom. But he 
knew that at present neither he nor anybody else would be 
allowed to surrender Moscow without a fight. The temper of 
the people, primarily of the peasants, and the temper of the - 
army was such that it would be utterly impossible for him to 
retreat without at least one general engagement. One of his 
contemporaries wrote that "whoever proposed that Moscow be 
surrendered without 'a shot would be' regarded by the whole 
people as a traitor." 
As the Russian army was moving from Gzhatsk toward 
---. Mozhaisk it was reinforced by abbut 15,000 men under the 
",. 
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command of Miloradovich, and by a force of io,ooo Moscow 
militia, under the commarid of Count Markov. On receiving 
these reinforcements Ku tuzov definitely decided to acckpt 
battle. The Russian army halted and turned to face Napo- 
leon's advancing army. 
On reaching Gzhatsk on. September 2, Napoleon ordered a 
a rollcall to be taken of all his fighting forces situated in the 
town and its immediate vicinity. The number proved to be 
log,ooo infantry, 30,000 cavalry and 587 'guns. Meanwhile, the 
straggling units were catching up with the main force. 
On September 3, covered by the successful and stubborn 
resistance of their rear guard, commanded by General Konov- 
nitsin, Kutuzov, de Tolly and Bagration. reached the Kolotsk 
Monastery and there began to entrench themselves. 
Napoleon followed hot on Konovnitsin's heels, keeping him 
constantly engaged in battle. On September 5 it was reported 
to him that his vanguard had reach a redoubt. This was the 
Shevardino ~edoubt ,  which at the time Napoleon arrived was 
defended by a small force of -1 1,000 men under the command 
of Prince Gorchakov. These had been left behind as a covering 
force to conduct rear-guard actions. 0 
Against this small force Napoleon hurled over 35,000 picked 
troops, and when the battle was at its height he sent additional 
reinforcements to the attacking colummi. The battle lasted the 
whole day of September 5. The French made several cavalry 
assaults on the redoubt, but these were repulsed. Then two 
French infantry divisions and three regiments of the 3rd Di- 
vision were brought up. These pushed back Neverovsky's 
division, which occupied the approaches, and then stormed the 
redoubt itself. The Russian defendeh met the charge of the 
French troops with impetuous counter charges, rushing to cer- 
tain death with bayonets leveled and with wild cries of 
''hurrah!" The Russian gunners kept up their fire until the 
last moment, and when the French broke into the retrench- 
ments they did not retreat, as they could easily have done, but  
entered into a hand to hand fight and were cut down at their 
guns. It w a ~  long after midnight before Bagration received 
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Kutuzov's order to cease-his resistance and retreat.   he Frencli 
simply could ' w t  understand -how this unequal .battle couM 
- * - .  have Jasted so .I-. : ; ' :- . '  ... . . 
.On the same day, the ~ & s i a n  rear-guard commanded by 
Konovn,$da wais again attacked near the Kolot~k Monastery 
and forced bad to the village of mrodino. - - a  
' Napokeon. pursued the -~usoian atmy with three dense 
co1umrw:The -Imperjal-General Staff had taken up its quart- 
in .the village of - Valuyevo. Here .Napdeon received a dispatch 
from . the Shevardino Redoubt . stating that ''not = a .  single 
prisoner was taken." On September 6. ~apoleon rode up to ;he 
redoubt and, evidently desiring to verify the information: he- 
had received on the previous.day, asked: "How' many Russian 
prisoners were taken yesterday?" !.'They do not surrenh, Sire," 
came the reply. 
The- -French spent all of September 6 in preparations for 
battle. Napoleon did not go to bed that night. At dawn a 
courier arrived from Marshal- - .Ney with a message? asking 
whether he should launch the battle. The Russians had halted, 
he reported. "NOW we have them!" exclaimed Napoleon. 
"Fonvardl We will open the gates of Moscow!" At that mo- 
ment the sun rose behind the Russian canip. "Behold the sun 
of Austerlitz!" exclaimed the Emperor. 
Few battles in history up to &at time could be compared. 
with the battle of Bordino for its bloodiness, its fkrocity 
and its consequences. In this battle,. however, Napoleon not 
only failed to break- the spirit of the Russian *army, but also 
failed to terrorize the Russian people. A f t e r - B ~ ~ f i o  'and the 
fall of Moscow their resistance to. the eneqy b~carrhe'still more 
- . .  intense, .> --. . .  . t i .  . Z 
A t  5 A.M. a-fierce battle was opened on the left flank of the 
~ u s i a n  army,: where ~ a p t t i o d  forces were p ~ t e d  near the 
Semenovsky Rauine. Here Napoleon' had. sent . Marshal$ ' Da-' 
v o ~ t , .  Murat and. Ney: - The first 'assault$ were repulsed by 'thie 
Rusdiad artillery and ..heavy musket +fire.:! MBrshzb Davou t fell: 
he .was:rwounde&in athe -head %nd his horse w& 'killed &I&' 
him. In the first assaults on .-EMgncation's positiond:the, F**& 
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lost many officers, including several generals and colonels. Thc 
fortifications around. Semenovsky Ravine, af terwards known 
. as "Bagration's fl&che," -were hastily put up, but they were'. 
defended so fiercely that from 5 A.M. to i i:go A.M. all the 
desperate assylts of #the French were repulsed with frightful ' 
losses. By 7 A.M. Napoleon .had concentrated nearly 150 guns 
against this position. After-*a long preliminary bombardment, 
enormous forces were hurled against the ravine and the fl&che. 
Overwhelming forces were hukled against Vorontsov's *and 
Neverovsky 's divisions, which , were overthrown. and crushed. 
Iq this fight Neverovsky put up a desperate resistance and his - 
battalions made repeated bayonet charges. Murat, Ney and 
Davou t asked Napoleon for reinforcements, but the latter re- 
fused, for he was displeased with the fact that the- fleche had 
not yet been captured. . b 
Fierce and bloody fighting raged. The -fl&che, bestrewn with 
the corpses of w n  and horses, changed hands several times. 
Those who knew Bagration and who saw him during these 
feightful hours had.no doubt whatever that he would hold the 
fl&e or die in the attempt. 
Napolean neither would nor could abandon his plan of 
breaking through the Russian lines on the left flank and then 
-. of concentrating all his forces on the.center. The number of 
) .  French guns concentrated on this part of the line was now 
increased to 400, more than two-thirds of Napoleon's artillery, 
, and another general assault ,on 'the fleche was ordered. 
"Here an important event occurre&" relates a Pafticipanr 
in- this battle. "Realizing what the marshals were aiming at, 
and seeing the menacing advance of the French forces, Prince 
Bagration, made a desperate decision. An order was given, and 
the whole of our left flank, a 1  along the line, marched forward 
at a -quick pace with leveled bayonets." The . Russian attack 
was repulsed, and Davout ordered a counter-attack. The French 
grenadiets, refraining from firing in order. to save ti*, hurled 
themselves upon the. flkhe. They were &owed d&m by 'Rus- 
sian bu1iets. A-hail of chain shot i v a s  poured upon the Rhssian 
defenders from t . k  French batteries; \ 
/ ,  
.4t that moment a fragment of a shell hit Bagration and 
broke his hip bone. For a while he tried to hide from his 
troops the fact that he had been wounded in order that they 
should not become dismayed, but blood poured from his 
wound and he began slowly to slip from his horse. His adju- 
tants managed to catch him before he fell, and carried him 
away. 
This was the crucial moment of the battle. The soldiers not 
only loved Bagration more than any other of their command- 
ers in this war, except perhaps Kutuzov, but they believed him 
to be invincible. Witnesses relate that "the spirit seemed to 
leave the whole left flank" when Bagration died. 
'The left flank was broken. From all sides Kutuzov received 
reports of heavy losses. The soldiers had fought with amazing 
valor and thousands had fallen. As was the case at Smolensk, 
wounded soldiers stolidly bore their pain- and stuck to their 
posts in spite of the orders of their oRcers to go to the rear. 
The officers were no less staunch than their men on that day. 
Aftet the capture of the flkche, the next important episode 
in the battle of Borodino was the fight for Rayevsky's battery, 
-stationed on a hill in the center of the Russian line; The . 
French captured the village of Borodino, but were driven 
out of it by the Russian chasseurs. The French made another 
assault, captured the village again, and this time were able 
to hold ,it.. Eughne, Viceroy of Italy, then crossed the Koloch 
River and led an assault on the great battery, which had been 
subjected to repeated attack since lo o'clock that morning. 
Under General Bonamy the French took the battery by 
assault, but were repulseci. They captured it a second time, 
but again they were repulsed. During this assault Colonel 
Monakhtin, Chief of Staff of the 6th Army Corps, received 
two bayonet wounds, but at the third assault of the French he 
managed to shout to the Russian soldiers, pointing to the 
battery: "Boys, imagine that this is Russia; defend her with 
your lives!" At that moment a bullet entered his stomach, and 
he was carried off the battlefield. This brave officer lived only 
a few days longer. On learning that Moscow had been aban- 
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doned to the enemy lqe;-ti,m the-bandages from hts-woun~s . and 'died. 
Enholov.drove Broussier's division out of Rayevsws battery 
and from the approaches to it. General Bonamy, his' body 
pierced in 'many places with bayonet wounds, was 'taken 
prisoner. Napoleon demanded the destruction 'of ~a~evsk$s  . . 
battery at all costs. b 
. At o P.M., Napoleon ordered his artillery to occupy the posi- 
ticmi-'bound the Bagration flkhe, which the French had cap- 
tured after the death of Bagration. From this point a hellish 
fire mowed down the Russian troops; .but never before had 
, Russian soldiers, privates and officers alike, shown . .  su'ch . con- 
tempt 'for danger and death as they did on that' day. ' 
The French fire grew in intensity. It became obvious' that 
Napoleon was. determined to capture'. Rayevsky's battery and, 
after achieving victory in this 'atiillery duel, to break up the 
Rubian army with artillery fire and .put it to flight. But this 
didmot happen. The Russian drmy retreated in perfect order. 
. By g P.M. three-fourths of the '&fenden of the battery had 
been killed and the rest thrown ba&. The battery remained 
in the hands of the French. But the Russians had not fled from 
the battlefield, their guns ' had not .been silenced. 
Night set 'in. The biggest battle that Napoleon had ever 
fought .was drawing to a close. But what was the: result? 
Neither Napoleon nor his marshals could say definitely.   one 
ofbthem was conscious of a feeling of .victory. The marshils 
conversed grumblingly with one another: Mdrat said .that all 
day long the. Emperor had been ' quite . ' ~ n r e ~ ~ i z a & ;  . ~ e y  
:. - said that the --Emperor had forgot ten his busineis. 
Th,e thunder .of artillety iaria' 'the; :heavy "figh€ing w& heard 
on both. *@ides un ti1 'nightfzillj bii t 'th:e Russians had w,in'ten- 
. . .  .-. . tiom.:of fetfeating, let -afone of *fleeing in panic: '' 
. That: bvehing Napoleon rbd* &er the batt~efield,.&brose and 
gloomy, fid%aying a wdrd to Ms'atttenkhnts; his gkne.rals dared 
not. 'ii~!t&~upt 'his' refldctimi The*' @bans' .'and pf the 
\ 
wouirded wereheard on all sid&. The ~us s i i h  wotilidg(lrho~- 
ever, arnazd-the genirali.. i c~&kf  Bid not utter a groan? 
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one of them 1,ater. "Perhaps, being far. away from their own 
men, they had less expectation ,of mercy. But the truth is that 
they seemed to 
wounded, but only joo were taken prisoner. Shortly before 
' 
his death Napoleon, while reminiscing, said: "The most fright- 
ful battle I ever fought was that near Moscow. The French ,de- 
served their victory, but the Russians deserved the title of - 
ifivincibles." 
In the long run, the battle of Borodino proved to be a great 
victory for the Russian people over the dictator of Europe. 
It markedthe beginning of that incredibly difficult task of 
overthrowing Napoleoa that was finally accomplished three 
years later. 
At night, ~a;>oleon was the first to withdraw his troops from ' 
the battlefield; he did this before Kutuzov issued his order 
to retreat. The Russian army retreated from Borodino to 
Moscow and beyond in pe rk t  order; but the main thing was- 
that the spirit of the Russian troops had not been shaken in 
the least. Borodino had merely served to fan their hatred of 
the invader and to intensify their thirst for revenge. 
THE FIRE OF MOSCOW 
FTER retiring a little way from the battlefield both the A French and Russian armies remained inactive for sev- 
eral hours. Both sides were engaged in counting up their 
losses, checking the figures and ascertaining the results of the 
battle. 
Corps commanders and adjutants came to Kutuzov one 
after another and their reports drove the aged Field Marshal 
to the conclusion that he must surrender Moscow without even 
attempting to hold up Napoleon's forces. To be more precise, 
he understood that now he would be allowed to surrender 
Moscow without another battle. The Sixth, Seventh and - 
Eighth Corps had been' almost entirely annihilated. The other 
units of his army had also suffered heavy losses. On the other 
hand, Kutuzov learned that Napoleon's Guard was still intact, 
as i t  had not taken part in the battle. Next day he also learned 
that Napoleon's right wing was outflanking the Russian left , 
wing. It became utterlv impossible to stay here longer without 
giving battle; but it i a s  also impossible to give battle at the 
moment. ~utuzov decided to retire on Moscow. 
He reached the village of Fili, on the outskirts of Moscow, 
and here, on September 13, 18 13, he called his most important 
generals to a council of war to discuss whether the Russian 
army should enter into another engagement or retreat beyond 
Moscow and allow the city to fall into Napoleon's hands. In - 
submitting this question he uttered the opinion he had h ~ l d  , 
all along, but hitherto had not expressed to anyone: "As long + 
as the army exists and is capable of offering resistance to the 
enemy we can'hope for a favorable consummation of the war; 
but if the army is destroyed, Moscow and Russia will perish." . 
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'The council of war lasted only a little over an hour. Rather 
unexpectedly for those present, the Field Marshal abruptly 
closed the. proceedings and, rising from his seat, announced 
that he therewith ordered a retreat. During the rest of the day 
Xutuzov spoke to nbbody. At night he returned to the hut in 
which he had taken up his quarters, but he did not .go to bed. 
Several times that night he was heard to weep. 
The lastynits of the retreating Russian army .were crossing 
the bridge of the small river Yauza that runs into the Moscow 
River when General Miloradovich, the commander of the 
rear guard, received information that the French cavalry was 
entering Moscow through the Dorogomilov Gate. All day 
apd night, and well into the next day, an endless stream of 
a3$umanity flowed out of Moscow across the Yauza Bridge. 
.%utuzov . . led the Russian army southward to Krasnaya Pakhra 
ind thence to the old Kaluga road. At night he was drink- 
p!g tea in the village of Uopa, and the peasarits sitting around 
him pointed horrorstricken to the glare reflected in the sky 
bf Moscow burning in the distance. "Kutuzov, shifting his 
kap with a vigorous gesture, answered: 'It's a pity, of course; 
but You wait, I'll break his head. . . .' " 
On September g, Napoleon arrived at Mozhaisk and left 
, on the 12th. He then hastened after his army, which was, 
marching to Moscow, and caught up with it when the van- 
! guard was approaching Poklonnaya Hill. This was on Septem- 
%be?- 13. He had spent the night in the village of Vyazem, and 
all that night and the next morning the vanguard of the 
French army streamed past the village on the way to Moscow. 
At 2 P:M. on September 14 he and his aides ascended Po- 
klonnaya Hill and saw the panorama of Moscow spread out to 
their view. A bright sun lit up the vast city and caused its 
innumerable gilded domes to gleam. The Old Guard that fol- 
lowed behind Napoleon's suite, forgetting discipline, broke 
ranks and scrambled up the hill shouting in a thousand voices: 
'',MOSCOW! Moscow!'' Riding to a higher mound, Napoleon 
halted, and he, too, with unconcealed triumph, exclaimed: 
aMoscowl" 
The men on that hill at that hour were ready to believe 
that the resistance of the Russian people had been broken 
and that the signing of an armistice, and then of peace, was 
only a matter of a few days. 
Meanwhile, the sun began to set and the Frenchmen 
gathered on the hill began to comment among themselves on a 
rather strange circumstance. Murat had already entered the 
kty, and in a parallel column the corps commanded by Viceroy 
Eughne were pouring in. Napoleon wanted to receive the keys 
of the city here on Poklonnaya Hill, and the first thing Murat 
and Eughne were to have done on entering the city was to 
arrange for a civic deputation to escort them into the city. 
But no deputation came. Suddenly, incredible news spread, 
first among the Guards, then among Napoleon's retinue, and 
finally reached Napoleon: no deputation from the inhabitants 
of Miscow need be expected because there were no inhabi- 
tants in Moscow. The whole population had abandone? 
the city! 
Murat had entered Moscow at noon. His cavalry advanced 
warily, fearing an ambush and sudden attack. But silence 
reigned hour after hour, while the French army poured into 
the city in an endless flood. Only when the leading detach- 
ment reached the Kremlin were a few shots fired from behind 
the closed gates. The French broke dawn the gates with a ' 
cannon ball and killed the few .men who were ,there. Who 
these people were is not known to this day. When the French 
broke into the fortress, one of its defenders flung himself upon 
a French officer with extraordinary fury, tried to strangle him 
and bit his hand through and through. He was killed like the 
'rest. 
Toward evening Napoleon was informed that the French 
* troops had occupied the city without meeting any resistance. 
He spent his first night in Moscow in an abandoned house 
near the Dorogomilov Gate. He was in a very gloomy mood. 
"What an awful wilderness!" he exclaimed when he saw the 
deserted streets. 
Before he went to bed several adjutants and orderlies ar- 
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rived -from different parts of the city remote. from each other. , 
All of them reported the same thing: Fires were starti& in the - 
city. '' ~t first the Emperor thought that his soldiers, 'scattered 
thrkgh the city, were looting the abandoned hbuses and fhe 
fire$ Were due- to their carelessness. But he had not $t man- ' 
aged to .fall asleep when, at three .o'clock in the-morning, he 
was informed that Gostinny Dvor, in the1 commercial dis- 
trict of Moscow, was on fire, that houses were burning which 
French soldiers had never entered, or in the. vicinity where no 
French soldiers had yet been. A strong wind was blowing 
which swept the sparks from the burning houses to neigh- 
boring buildings 8nd set fire to them too. 
'  he sun' rose, and 'in the daylight the glare of the 'hies' was 
hidden by a thick pall of smoke. No doubt 'a number 'of 
people had remained in ~oscow who at great risk to the'ir 
lives were determined to 'destroy all they could rather than 
allow anything to fall into the hands of the enemy. . Bpt there 
' is no doubt also that many of the fires were startedi by the 
French soldiers when they pillaged the abandon*: houses and 
.. I . . 
shops. 
- The 'conflagration grew. The whole of kitai @rod, the 
commercial. center of Moscow,, was ablaze. on the evening of 
September 15 the granaries on the banks'of the ~oscow ~ i w r  
caught fire' and the sparks blew up a large grenade a'nd baqb 
dump that had 'been abandoned by the Russian garrison. So 
strong was the glare of the codiag-ration that some pans of the 
city seemed to be bathed in daylight: . 
That night Napoleon' was rqused fikm 4is Sleep ,bya the 
bright light that shone through his windowa'in the Kremlin 
Palace. He passed from window to window facing different 
pats  of .the city and &all sides hewas Amos; blinded by the 
. . 
glare of enormous tongues df ' f l a k  ih&ting up to the sky. 
He had taken up  his quarters in the Kremlin together yith 
his attendants a d  the Old. Guard. .Th= F**& '&il&qixtorFs . t* 
had been' transfe'ired here, too; This .&eatdd' q s~rioug, M f r  
for - higjelf: his suite, ;his' &&!!I Staff ,a*& 'e. ,old.-&p@, 
for the .kitid : still "sri-o&'and &j bl&ing &; flames 
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palace of the tsars, in tHe Kremlin!" He knew the .:$ 
place that the Kremlin. held in the history of Russia and he ~ ' - : ~ ~  
was reluctant to leave it after having been there less than a 
I . ,  
ies were heard: "The Kremlin is burning!" The Em- . - !  
cided to transfer his quarters to Peter's Palace, which .&. -.i  
a park situated, at that time, outside the city. - ,'- : -: +: '- 
He'left .the Kreinlin accompanied by his 'suite and the Old - - '  ; 
\ 
1 v 1 , -i' 
re surrounded by a sea'of fire. The flames cut us off, 
xits. from the fortress and drove us back at o u r ,  ',;!,: 
' 
ing out to the Moscow River. By this track, Napoleon, his 
officers and his guards managed to slip out of the Kremlin. 
But what did they gain by that? They found. themselves 
near- to the ionflagration, and could neither retreat nor 
remain where they--were. But how' to go fonvard? How could . I  ' 
one plunge i n t ~  this surgiri sea of fire? a "People- were running t rough .the city, stunned b y  the 
storm and blinded with dust, not knowing where they were, 
for. the streets had vanished amidst the smoke and ruins. 
Nevertheless, we had to make haste. Every moment the roar 
of the Barnes grew in intensity. The only crooked street visible, 
burning on all sides, seemed to lead into this hell rather than 
.out-of it. The Emperor, on foot, unhesitatingly plunged into-. 
this dangerous passage. He stepped out into the conflagration 
amidst the noise of collapsing arches, of falling beams and of 
red-hot sheet-iron roofs caving in all around him. 
"We walked on burning earth between -two walls of fire. 
The penetrating heat seared our eyes, which, however, we were 
compelled to keep open in view of the danger. The' air was suf- 
'focating; dust and sparks flew around, and tongues of flame 
licked us on all sides. We began to breathe in short, dry gasps, 
and we were almost asphyxiated by the smoke. . . ." 
, 
The conflagration raged for two more days and destroyed 
nearly three-fourths of the city. Fires continued to break out 
even after this, and hardly a day passed during the period 
that the French were in Moscow but what fires broke out in 
some part of the town or other. All this time Napoleon was in 
a most somber mood. He realized that it would be more diffi- 
cult now to conclude peace with the Tsar than before; but 
he was not yet aware that at that moment it was not only diffi- 
cult but impossible to conclude peace with Russia; that the 
war which he thought had come to a close with the capture 
of Moscow had only just begun for the Russian peopk. 
In the prevailing situation Napoleon was confronted with 
two urgent tasks of primary importance. The first was ;to 
secure the -conclusion of peace, here in Mmow. The second 
was to prevent the stocks of food and clothing that might 
survive the fire from being looted by his own soldiers, and to 
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resto* discipliqe- in his motley amy: Both tasks proved to be 
beyond' his powers. 
Tfie"fire was already subsiding in the central parts of ;the 
city when Napoleon left Peter's Palace to return to the K&m- 
lin, but it still raged on the outskirts. On the day he resinned 
his residence in the Kremlin he- was informed that .Major 
General Tutolmin, the head of the Moscow orphanage, had 
asked for a pard to be placed near this institution to pro- 
tea the inmates who had remained in .Moscow. Quite unex- 
pctedly, Napoleon not only granted Tutolmin's request, but 
even invited him to the Kremlin. During his conversation 
with the general, Napoleon was very kind and gracious. 
He asked Tutolmin whether he had any other request to 
make. To  this the General replied that he would like to re: 
ceive permission do send a report to the Tsarina, who was the 
patroness of all the orphanages in Russia. Napoleon not 'only 
consented to this, but asked Tqtolmin to add a note saying 
that- he, Napoleon, respected Alexander as of old, and would 
like to eonclude peace. Tutolmin wrote as he was .requested, 
and sent his report off that vevday by an official of his de- 
partment who, by a signed order ,of theXmperor, was allowed 
to pass the French outposts.. . 
This first attempt to conclude peace was totally- ulllilce 
Napoleon's usual behavior, and this 'alone showed that the 
Emperor did not feel quite 'confident. - . 
The second attempt was made two:, days after Napoleon's 
cowersation with Tutolmin'.' A rich Moscow gentleman* 
named Yakovl w (father, of the famous. Alexander Ivanovich 
Henen) fou'nd himself and his ' family .. itrandid . in Moscow 
and was in extfdmely straitened cir&fnstarices. He' therefore 
appealed to Mhha l  Mortier- for askiLtance to leave the"civ' - 
The Marshal -%ad .' kfi&n' ~ a k h l e v  :in -~ai.is, ' and' on ihe' 
streiigth . of this. aeijuaintddkd!" Kit. reported his request to 
Napoleon. . ~apoleon summsned Yakovlev to' appeir -bkforki 
hiin. .Yakovlev cam; and &iieated'**hii re+est.'':~a$Ikdi!r' at 
fiist. gefefused but 'ifter yako*T&$ @d ~ ' i m ~ l o ~  hB'@ih: &df 
+to rec&id& his: d&fsfa>hC ' tGughi f*=' .$* s i j , g n t  ' 
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and suddenly asked: "Will you take a lettqr from me to the 
Emperor? If you will, I will you a pass for yourself and . 
all your family." . ' 
"I would accept Your Majesty's proposal, but I cannot guar- 
antee to ful'fill it," answered Yakovlev. 
, "Will you give me your word of honor that you will make 
every possible effort to deliver the letter in person?" asked 
Napoleon. "I promise on my honor, Sire," answered Yakov- 
lev. 
On September 00, Napoleon wrote a letter to Alexander, 
and Yakovlev took it with him. That letter reached its des- 
tination. Although. not a direct proposal for peace, it was 
a peace proposal nevertheless. But Alexander left Tutolmin's . 
report as well as ~a~o leon ' ;  letter unanswered. 
Two weeks elapsed. On the morning of October 5 two 
French officers appeared at the Russian outposts under a white 
flag and stated that General Marquis ~ a u i s t o n  had arrived 
and desired to meet Field Marshal Kutuzov. .The meeting was 
arranged, and an interesting 'conversation ensued. Lauriston 
stated that it was not the French who had set fire to Moscow. 
The Russian general replied that he: was aware of this; the fire 
had been started by the Rtissians who held Moscow in no 
higher estimation than any other city in the empire. Lauris- 
. ton then said: 'You must not think that our position is des- 
'perate; our armies are about equal." T o  this Kutuzov replied 
that the Russian people regarded the French in the same light 
as, the Tartars who had invaded Russia under Genghiz Khan. 
"But surely there is some difference?.' expostulates Lauriston. 
"The Russian people do not see any," answered the Field 
Marshal. 
With these impressions on his mind, and fully 'conscious 
of the utter fruitlessness of his visit to Kutuzov, Lauriston 
returned to the Kremlin to report to Napoleon. B U ~  Napoleon 
was so keen on concluding 'pace h Moscow-so as to be able 
to pose as, victor-that he resolved to write to Alexander urg- 
ing him to repli to his proposal. On October 20, fifteen days 
after ~auriston's conversation with Kutuzov, Colonel Berterni 
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was sent to the Russian Field Marshal with a letter from 
Marshal Berthier, Chief of Napoleon's General Staff, asking 
whether a reply had been received from the Tsar and urging 
the necessity of "restoring order9'-of concluding peace. Kutu- 
zov replied to Berthier stating that no reply had been received 
and that the delay was due to the distance and the difficulties 
of traveling on the autumn roads. To this he added: 
/ 
"It is difficult to restrain a people which has been infuriated 
by all that it has seen; a people that has known no war within 
its frontiers for three hundred years; which is prepared to sac- 
rifice itself for its native land and which draws no distinction 
between what is customary and what is not costumary in ordi- 
nary warfare." 
Strictly speaking, in this period, from Odober 6, when 
Lauriston returned from his conversation with Kutuzov, to 
October 14, when he began to issue orders which' clearly 
indicated that he was preparing to evacuate Moscow, Napo- 
leon did not expect any reply from St. Petersburg; nor was it 
possible for a reply. to arrive earlier than the iSth, 19th or the 
loth at the very outside. The Emperor was extremely im- 
tated. For whole nights he paced the grounds of the Krem- ' 
.lin discussing all sorts of new 'plans; bu t  to Count Daru he . 
confessed the real &use of his perturbation. The question 
uppermost in his mind was: how to extricate himself from 
the situation? How could he who had been accustomed only 
to attack and to conquer now start a retreat? 
On October 14 Napoleon instructed Berthier to repeat his 
order that not a single French battery on the way to the 
Grand.Amy be allowed to pass beyond Smolensk, and that 
beginning with October "7, no artillery or cavalry units should 
be sent to Moscow, but they be kept at Mozhaisk, Gzhatsk 
or Vyazma (wherever this order found them). "The Army 
will move to a different position," stated the order. The . 
wounded were evacuated from Moscow to Mozhaisk. . 
On October 18 Napoleon was holding a review of ' Marshal 
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Ney's corps in the courtyard of the Kremlin when suddenly 
the sound of artillery fire reached his ears. Shortly after, an 
adjutant arrived post haste with the information that Kutuzov 
had suddenly left Tarutino, had attacked Murat and had de- 
feated him. 
Actually, the sound of guns that reached Napoleon ema- 
nated from the positions occupied by the vanguard of the 
French army on the banks of the River Chernishna under 
the command of Murat. This force, consisting of about 22,- 
o m  men, had been standing here in complete inactivity since 
September rq. Kutuzov had left it in peace, and Murat, too, 
had refrained from iaunching any operations against Kutu- 
zov's forces in Tarutino. 
The Russian generals had taken Lauriston's visit to Kutuzav 
as evidence that the French army was in difficulties, and from ' 
that day Generals Bennigsen, Ermolov, Baggovut, and Pla- 
r3rov had continuously pleaed with Kutuzov to allow them to 
attack Murat's force. Kutuzov did not want an engagement, 
, even a minor one; but he yielded. to his officers' pleadings, 
deciding beforehand, however, not to allow this skirmish to 
develop into a big battle. On October 16, Kutuzov inspected 
the disposition of the Russian, forces for the impending battIe 
proposed by General Toll and approved it. 
On October 18, General Baggovut attacked Murat's 
left Bank and Orlov-Denisov his right flank. General Bennig- 
sen undertook the general direction of 'the battle. Kutuzov 
kept 'in the background. Orlov-Denisov's first cavalry charge 
was successful. The French were forced back and a number 
of guns were'captured. But the French rallied and met two 
regiments of dismounted chasseurs with withering fire. Among 
those to fall was General Baggovut. Bennigsen, judging that 
he lacked sufficient forces to carry his attack to a successful 
conclusion, asked Kutuzov for reinforcements, but the Field 
Marshal refused, and even the earnest solicitations of Errno- 
lov, Konovnitsin and Miloradovich in support of Bennigsen 
failed to move him. Murat was thus able to retreat slowlv and 
in perfect order to Spas-Kupla, on the Other side of the ~ i v e r  
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Chernishna,' saving himself by heavy fire from pursuit by 
0rlo.v-Denisov. ' I 
The battle of October 18-which for some reason is called 
the battle of Tarutino, although that villagellay far to the 
south of the scene of battle-had enormous political and moral 
- consequences, notwithstanding its meager military results. 
Morally, it served to raise the spirits of the Russian army,., 
for it was the first. purely offensive operation undertaken by 
the Russians in this war, and, above all, it was successful. . 
- Politically, it gave Napoleon the final impetus that decided 
him to leave Moscow. The battle of Tarutino led him to be- 
lieve that Kutuzov felt s$rong eliough to launch offensive 
operations and he therefore considered it advisable to move 
- to the south before the Russian commander-in-chief could bar 
the road. 
On October ig the French army began to leave Moscow. 
The column consisted of ioo,ooo troops (Mortier's garrison 
of 8,000 men temporarily remained) and an immense train 
6f wagons and carts piled up with loot. And in this train, ' 
on foot and in carriages, were thousands of foreigners with 
their wives and children who had remained in Moscow in 
anticipation of the arrival of the French and were now leaving 
in fear of the vengeance of the Russian people. 
The Emperor marched to Kaluga and on the way picked up 
the remnants of Murat's force. He sent an order to Mortier 
to blow 'up the Kremlin and leave Moscow to join the retreat- 
ing army. 
The evacuation of Moscow continued throughout the 20th 
and o 1st of October. On the 2 1st explosions in the ~ reml in  
rent the air and made the very ground of Moscow tremble. 
The arsenal and part of the Kremlin walk were blown sky 
high;, fires broke out in the armory and in the ;churches. The 
Nikolsky Tower, as well as the towers facing the river, were 
partially destroyed. Happily, the rain had moistened the fuses 
of the mines and so the explosions did not cause all the dam- 
age that Napoleon had exp;cted. Nevertheless, they were pow- 
erful enough to destroy buildigp outside the Kremlin as well 
- 
I 
as within. The tall belfry know* as "Ivan thk- rea at" escaped 
destruction by sheer accident; the fuse of the mine placed 
under it was moistened by the rain. After every explosion the 
Kremlin Square was filled with the howls and groans of the 
wounded and the dying. 'The last .explosion occbrred near 
the Kremlin walls at dawn on October 23, and several hours 
aftemards the last of Mortier's garrison left the city. 
THE RETREAT OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY AND 
THE 'SPREAD OF PARTISAN WARFARE 
N APOLEON'S army, ioo,ooo strong, with its artillery and ammunition wagons, filed out of Moscow in an endless, 
motley stream, followed by a long train of baggage wagons be- 
longing to different military units. And these in turn were 
followed by carts, wagons and carriages filled with loot, belong- 
ing to the marshals, generals, officers and common soldiers. 
*Then came more army baggage wagons, artillery, and ammu- 
nition carts-seemingly without end. 
Napoleon had decided to retreat to Smolensk not by the 
old road, but by the new road through Kaluga, for he had 
no stores of any kind on the old road, and, besides, that road 
had -been utterly wrecked. True, he had no stores on the 
new road either, but as Marshal Davout expressed it, there 
were still "untouched villages" on that road, whereas the old 
road was a howling wilderness. "We shall to go Kaluga!" 
exclaimed Napoleon. "And woe to those who stand in my 
path!" 
This circumstance. brings out in striking relief the import- 
* ance of Kutuzov's famous maneuver-march to Tarutino. Had 
he not accomplished this he would have been unable to erect 
the impassable barrier south of Maloyaroslavets and cut 
across the French army's line of march to Kaluga. As soon as 
Kutuzov heard that Napoleon had left Moscow, he declared 
.that Russia was saved. His army was augmented by the amval 
of reinforcements and the enrollment of new conscripts. In 
the middle of October he had a force under his command of 
85,000 men, not counting the Cossacks. Napoleon's army re- 
ceived much fewer reinforcements. 
At 1 1  P.M. on October 22 a courier arrived at Kutuzov's 
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headquarters in Tarutino with a report from Dokhturov to 
the effect that Napoleon was marching on Maloyaroslavets and 
that he, Dokhturov, needed assistance. Ku tuzov, however, 
took no action for the moment. Here he pursued the same 
tactics as he had pursued six days earlier at the battle of 
Tarutino. He knew, of course, that Napoleon must not be 
allowed to reach Kaluga, for if he did he would capture all 
the matdriel that had been prepared for the Russian army 
and would, therefore, be in a much beter position to reach 
Smolensk. Moreover, the Kaluga-Smolensk road would be 
able to maintain the French troops much better than the 
Moscow-Smolensk road. 
I 
Kutuzov ordered Dokhturov to march to the village of Fo- 
minskoye and attack the French force there, which, according 
to the reports of spies, numbered 10,ooo men. On the way, 
however, Dokhturov learned that Fominskoye was occupied, 
not by a force of io,ooo men, but by nearly the whole of the 
French army headed by Napoleon, and that the French had 
already occupied Borovsk, a town much further to the south 
of Fominskoye and on the direct road to Kaluga. Dokhturov 
realized that it was necessary to turn at once sharply to the 
south and hasten to Maloyaroslavets, between Boro~sk and 
Kaluga. 
Fearing to disobey Kutuzov's orders, Dokhturov sent. a 
courier to him to ask permission to march to Maloyaro- 
slave ts. 
Kutuzov gave the required permission, but between theego- 
ing and coming of the message much valuable time was lost. 
Marching all night with but brief halts, Dokhturov reached 
Maloyaroslavets at 4 A.M. on October 23. Very soon after, 
however, Napoleon's army arrived and drove the Russian 
chasseurs from the outskirts of the town. 
Eight times that day, amidst ceaseless firing from both 
sides, Maloyaroslavets changed hands, the, Russians driving 
the French out at the point of the bayonet, and then the 
~ rench  driving out .the Russians. Dokhturov's force was 
nearly at its last gasp when at 2 P.M. Rayevsky's corps came 
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to his aid, and. at 4 P.I~. Kutyzov - . . * .  himself and the .. whole . 
~ussian a k y  arrived. - ' .  .. 
~&uzov made a detour andiiook up hi; @&ition the 
road between Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga. Night set in. The 
French, holiiing the town after the eighth assault, waited in 
.expectation of a general engztgcmcent. The cannon fire ceased. 
The town was ablaze. 
All that terrible night, gazing at the glare of the burning 
town and hearing the groans of the wounded, the cries of 
the French soldiers, and here and there repeated bursts of 
musket fire, the Russian army waited in anticipation of 
another Borodino, for there could not be the slightest doubt 
that Napoleon himself was now confronting them with the 
whole of his Grand Army. Early in the morning of the 25th 
Field Mazshd Kutuzov ordered his army to retire about two 
miles south of Maloyaroslavets. He had decided not to give 
battle here. His sore aim was to liberate Russia from the in- 
vaders with a minimum of loss to the Russian army. 
Miloradovich's vanguard retreated only a very short dis- 
tance fromathe town. Napoleon realized that to break through 
to Kaluga he would have to fight a general engagement on a 
?ale no less than that at Borodino. He dked not do this and 
for the first time in his life Napoleon retreated before the 
prospect of a general engagement. And for the first time in 
this sanguinary Russian campaign .he turned his back on the' 
Russian army and, instead of the pursuer, became the pur- 
sued, 
Marching through devastated towns and villages, *the French 
army burned everything that had survived the earlier con- 
flagration. It was already halfstarving when it started the re- 
treat from Moscow, but on the way to Smolensk it had to 
traverse a road which, as a participant in this campaign ob- 
sewed, "had already been denuded three months ago." 
Gradually the food shortage among the troops assumed 
catastrophic proportions. It  was hunger more than the frost 
that rapidly broke up Napoleon's army on the road from . 
Maloyaroslavets to Smolensk. Among the French forces dis- , 
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cipline was still maintained, but among the German and 
Italian, and partly among the Polish forces, the breakdown 
of discipline was assuming most menacing proportions. 
Meanwhile this national war, carried on up to now by the 
operations of the regular army and the unorganized opera- 
tions of the peasants, assumed a new form-  artisan war- 
fare. This is how it began. ' 
Five days before the battld of Borodino, Lieutenant Colonel 
Denis Davydov, who for five years had served as Bagration's 
adjutant, came to his superior and submitted to him a plan 
to harass Napoleon's long line of communications from the 
Niemen to Gzhatsk. He proposed that constant attacks and 
sudden raids be made on this line, op the. French bases, on 
couriers and food trains. This, he suggested, coulci be carried 
out by small mounted detachments, which could rapidly go 
into hiding and escape pursuit after each operation. Fur- 
thermore, he suggested that thebe irregular units could become 
points of concentration of armed peasants. Bagration sub- 
mitted this plan to Kutuzov, who allowed Denis Davydov a 
force of fifty ~ussa r s  and eighty dossacks. This farce set out 
and, making a detour of the Grand Army, succeeded in getting 
into its rear. Such was the very modest and so far imper- 
ceptible beginning of the partisan warfare, which was un- 
doubtedly one of the decisive factors in the second phase of 
the war of 1812, 
I 
Regular army officers were not the only organizers of parti- 
san units. For example, on August 31, 1812, the Russian 
rear guard w+s making a fighting retreat from Tsarevo-Zai- 
mishche, which the French had occupi'ed. During the fight- 
ing Ermolay Chetvertakov, a -Russian dragoon, had his 
horse shot under him and he was taken prisoner. At Gzhatsk, 
he succeeded in escaping from the guard and made his way 
to the village of Basmany, far to the south of the Smolensk 
highroad along which the French army was marching. Here 
the same idea of harassing Napoleon's army by means of ir- 
regular forces occurred to Chetvertakov. He de~ided to form 
peasant partisan units. 
\ 
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When he made his proposal to the peasants of. Basmany, 
they were very suspicious of him and he obtained only one 
recruit. With this recruit he made for anoth-er village. On 
the road they encountered two Frenchmen, whom they' killed, 
taking their clothes in order to disguise themselves. Further 
on, in the village of Zadkovo, they encountered two French 
cavalrymen. They killed these soldiers as well and took their 
horses. In this village Chetvertakov obtained forty-seven 
recruits. This small force, under Chetvertakov's command, 
first wiped out a party of twelve French cuirassiers, and later 
exterminated and put to flight a half-company of French 
soldiers, fifty-nine strong, and captured their baggage. 
These successes created a deep impression upon the peas- 
antry in this area, so much so that even the village of Bas- 
many now provided a53 volunteers. Chetvertakov, although 
illiterate, proved to be a splendid organizer, tactician and 
strategist in partisan warfare. Harassing the enemy by sudden 
raids, skillfully and warily tracking down small units of 
Frenchmen and exterminating them by lightning attacks, he 
succeeded in preventing a large area of territory m u n d  
Gzhatsk from being looted and devastated by the French. 
Chetvertakov was ruthless in his operations; and, besides, the 
peasants were so fierce in their hatred of the French that they 
could not be restraind. 
From the beginning of September to the end of November, 
when Napoleon retreated across the Berezina, the partisans 
undoubtedly performed great and useful service. They were 
splendid and often recklessly bold scouts. One of them, Fig- 
ner by name, used to disguise himself as a French soldier 
and-on numerous occasions-wander around the French 
camps. Another named Seslavin once silently approached 
a French non-commissioned officer, picked him up and flung 
him across his saddle and brought him to the Russian head- 
quarters. Davydov, with a party of 200 to 300 men, caused 
forces five times that number to flee in panic, captured their 
baggage, released Russian prisoners of war and sometimes 
captured enemy guns. 
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The partisans obtained valuable assistance in  peir opera- 
tions from t&e peasants, who' displayede even - greater r l  wjlling- . 
ness to cooperate with them than with the regular army. 
Th& assis~ance, was- particularly- valuabie at he beginning o f  
the movement. In the Brqqnitski District, MOSCOW Gubernia, 
in the villqge qf ~ i c d a - ~ ~ & e l ~ ,  n & vyaz&a, in Bezhetsk, 
Dorogobuzh and .$erpukhov,, the peasants tracked down small 
enemy units, killed the French f&agers grid marauders, and 
willingly provided the partisan uniw with food for men and 
horses, Without this Gsistqce the paqisans would not have 
achieved the resuits they dgd. , . . !  
. .   hen came the. retreat of the Grand Army, which began . 
with the senseless blowing up of the K.re&lin. This malicious 
act infuriated the people when they retur&d to Moscow and 
- f~ynd  :*e Kremlie in ruins. They . reiwd&d' . ,it as the crown- 
ing insult to all, they had suffered. In confo6ty  with Napo- 
leon's orders, d l  tQe t o m  and villagesf on &':French army's 
line of retreat were burned to the g-round: In Vyazma a 
number of. Russian prisoners of war were, found locked up 
in the church, which had been set on fire. The church had 
escaped destruction by sheer accident. ~ h & e  actions served 
still . - further to fan the fury of the Russian people. 
The peas+nts did not cdnfine their , &perations to .helping 
the partisan unik track down and 'kill. marauders and strag- 
glers, and exterminate foragers, although it must be said that 
these were the most telling blows they steck at the starving 
Grapd ~ r m ~ .  ~ u ~ a s i m  Kurin, a ~ e k a h t  of the village of 
Pavlovo. near ~o~orodoisk,  formed a 'peasant unit, m e d  it 
with weapons taken' from. dead ~renchmen and, with his 
assistant Stqlov, led it into batde even against French cavalry, 
and put them to flight. . , . 
In this struggle the peasant woE& displayqd no less valor 
than the men.  or example Vasiliia, the wife of the elder 
of a village. in the Sychevski ~isifict ,  ~molensli ~bbernia, fke- 
quently attacked straggling French baggage wagons with pitch- 
fork or scythe, killed many French soldiers, and took many 
prisoners. She w& by n.o means an exception. 
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Napoleon and his Guards marched in the vanguard of the 
retreating army. On November 8 he entered Srnolensk and 
was followed by sections of the various units of the army. By 
the 15th the whole arpy had arrived. During this dreadful 
march from Maloyaroslavets Napoleon and his generals had 
placed all their hopes on Smolensk. Here, they expected to 
find stocks of food-and a fairly quiet haven where the weary 
and starving men and.horses would obtain some rest and re- 
cuperate from the terrible sufferings they had endured during 
she retreat. But it turned out otherwise. In this lifeless, de- 
molished and smoldering city the retreati~lg army received 
a blow that utterly broke the spirit of many of its units. 
Hardly Ay food was found. 
From that moment the retreat became a flight, and all 
that the Grand Army had suffered on the road from 
Maloyaroslavets paled into insignificance compared with the 
abyss that now opened up before it and swallowed it almost 
en tirely. 
The last days of this bloody struggle were approaching. 
The death throes of Napoleon's army lasted from November 
17, when it had started out from Smolensk, to the evening 
of December 14, when its rear guard, consisting of several 
hundred able-bodied men under Marshal Ney, together with 
several thousands of unarmed, wounded and sick men, crossed 
the Niemen and reached the Prussian side. 
On November 14, after a stay of five days, Napoleon wiih 
his Guards marched out of Smolensk in the direction of 
Krasnoye. He was followed by the remnants of the army corps 
commanded by Viceroy Eughne, Davout and Murat. Behind 
them marched the rear gu&d, commanded by Marshal Ney. 
Following on Ney's heels came the Russian forces. The days 
were approaching when Ney was destined by a desperate 
struggle and skillful maneuver to save Napoleon and his 
110,000 to 45,000 men, and the 30,ooo sick, unarmed, weary and 
disab1.d men who had plodded behind the army from Smo- 
lensk through Krasnoye to Dubrovno and Orsha. 
On November 20 Napoleon left Orsha Three days later the 
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advance patrols of his vanguard saw before them a long strip 
. of murky water. This was a fairly wide river with very muddy 
banks, - not yet,frozen, but here and there already covered with 
small patches of ice. It was difficult to ford this river even 
' under Aord~nary. conditions; how miich more difficult was it 
now that it w'= beginning to freeze. This was the Berezina 
River.- Napitsam and his ~Gards were a.pproa_ching a mortalfy 
.dangerouS barrier, which they had- ts..&ver~orne or else yerish, 
, - -1 
THE CROSSING OF THE BEREZINA AND THE 
DOOM OF NAPOLEON'S ARMY 
0 N NOVEMBER 16 the city of Minsk, where Napoleon expected to find large stocks of food and munitions, was 
. captured by the Russian troops, the vanguard of Chichagov's . 
army. Napoleon learned of this two days later, before entering 
Orsha. Soon after, he was amazed to hear that Chichagov had 
already occupied Borisov. He at once sent orders to his gen- 
erals to concentrate as many troops as possible near Borisov - 
in order to cover his retreat across the Borisov Bridge to the 
right bank of the Berezina.. 
On November 25 he succeeded by a series of skillful ma- 
neuvers and demonstrations to direct Chichagov's attention on 
Borisov and south of it, and while the latter was concen- 
trating his forces there Muiat, Oudinot and two generals of 
the Corps of Engineers built two bridges across the Studianka, 
a tributary of the Berezina. 
On the night of November 25 the Imperial Guard arrived 
at the Studianka. At dawn next day Napoleon arrived. He 
gave the order to cross the river at once. At that moment 
he had at his command only 19,000 men. The crossing was 
started under the fire of ~enera l  Chaplits, who was the first 
, to learn that Napoleon was diverting his troops from Borisov. 
Napoleon ordered that the bridgeheads on both banks of the 
river be strongly guarded. All day long troops continued to 
arrive. At night he ordered Marshal Ney with the remnants 
of his corps and the Young Guard to cross to the right bank 
and, battalion following battalion, the crossing continued all 
night and during the whole morning of the gth. At about 
P P.M. on the 27th Napoleon with the Old Guard crossed the 
; river, followed 6 y  other divisions. 
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' The French army lined up on the right bank of the river, 
and when the last of the forces had crossed Napoleon ordered 
the bridges to be blown up. 
And now the world was to witness the final death agony 
of this great horde. Napoleon had no time to arrange for the 
crossing of the wounded and sick and the foreign civilians 
who followed his army from Moscow; they were all left to 
their fate. An eye witness has described the scene that en- 
sued as follows: 
"On the evening of that day when Napoleon crossed the 
Berezina, the Veselovski plain, which is yather wide, presented 
: a horribleaand indescribable picture. It owas covered with car- 
, riages and carts-most of them broken and piled up one on top 
: of the other-and strewn with the bodies of dying women and '' children who had followed the army from Moscow either to 
f -  escape the horrors of that city or to accornpatiy their fellow 
i:  countrymen. . . . 
C "The fate. of thesg u~?fortunate, people caught between two 
fighting armies was awful. Many of them were, trampled under 
the horses' hoofs, others were crushed by the  heavy wagons, 
while many were mowed down by the 'bail of shot and shell, or 
drowned in the river in trying to ford it with the troop. At . 1 ihe most moderate estimate, ten thousand people must have 
@ .  
F b, perished. . . ." 
t 
Bur \besi'de this glbo&y ' we have another provided 
bi ' h e  dminhicen=ei of &her ' eperwh&es, which reyeais the 
f ma.indnibiiy and hum;iniiy displayed'by the Rp& soldiers: 
I tokard' . .  'the* . vanquish& 'foe: ' ~eneri1 'L&.webteli-n,, r a:. a ,  f ir '  ex; 
I- ampie, wrote: "A frightful knowstorin wk raging; ,I ~ o s t ' m ~  
i$y and found myself entirely alone." His car&d'h'i;n, . A .:J: . , t ,  2 ; ' + .:* , A ,  
hal£:fr~z~&, + .  : L  toiv*d : the kussi+ . .  I &z$pfir@.. 
- ... * , -.;: - Tf*  . : bt* 1- ; :i:* % .  2 , .  
- - >  r . :., . *, ' ' . 1 .  " 0  * . i '  - < .  - g t -  i; * ! . , # f i  .. I;;.: . .  . ? .  
"In tfie if0q-t; whero we ;were. b i v ~ ~ c k & ~ ~  be c?ntiqpes, 
' . C  
'!man)r French &1dk5 xere. hidipg 5orFttbe,,nigikl; Thq. ? . .  -e 2 
out "wlfiq?! *ir alms tq. w3T3 *'gef!\va qt  ,:pu?i : h 9 g ! ~ ~ ~ 4  
was our astonishment next qorning when we'saw-forty w 
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fifty Frenchmen squatting in a circle round each fire without 
betraying the si-ightest sign of fear. Our good, kind Karpenko, 
who- had dh16ssly cut down the* enemy when' he was face to 
face with him, saved the lives of many of these unfortunate 
men." 
At -ths time .the position of the French army was catas- 
- .&w@xic. 
I 
"The wind and frost .were cruel; all the roads -we= snowed 
under. Crowds of Frenchmen were staggering in a field near by. 
Some of them managed to light a fire and sat around it. Others 
cut slices of flesh from the dead horses and ate it, some roasted 
and some even raw. Saon 1 carne across people who were freez- 
ing, or already frozen to death. . . ." 
By this time hunger among the troops had reached its high- 
est pitch. On November 28 a severe frost set in, which reached 
3 1 below zero (F) and lasted until December 12. 
The historian Skgur, who was with the French army at that 
time, asserts that about 60,000 men crossed the Berezina with 
Napoleon and that anqther 20,000 from the army corps on 
- the flanks joined them. Of these 8o,ooo, however, 40,000 
perished on the way from the Berezina to Vilna. And many 
more were destined to perish on the way from Vilna to the 
Niemen. 
On December g the first groups of half-frozen and starving 
men entered Vilna. They immediately ransacked the stores 
so that they could eat and clothe themselves before they were 
driven off by the Russians. Next day the first Russian units 
began to approach Vilna. The French troops retired to the 
Niemen at Kwno. 
Napdeon had left the army at Smorgonia on December 6, 
appointing Murat, King of Naples, commander-in-chief of its 
remnants. At that moment Napoleon regarded the Russian 
campaign merely as a lost round in a game, and his mind 
wakalready absorbed with plans for another w h a  he hoped 
he would play better than he had this one. He  was not yet 
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aware that the wound inflicted upon him by the Russian 
people was mortal, and would put an end to his world empire. 
The Russian campaign drew to a close. In the latter half of 
December the survivors of Macdonald's units, and small 
crowds of weary men who had lost their way in the forests of 
Lithuania, continued to cross into Prussia. On the whole, 
less than 30,ooo men remained under the command of Murat 
and, after his departure, under the command of the Viceroy 
of Italy, Eugene de Beauharnais. And this was all that re- 
mained of the Grand Army-of the 420,000 men who, on June 
24, 18 I 2, crossed the Niemen on four bridges, and the 150,000 
'men who subsequently joined this army. 
THE REASON FOR THE COLLAPSE OF NA- 
POLEON'S POWER IN EUROPE 
S EVERAL generations of thinkers have been uninterrupted- ly engaged in probing the causes of Napoleon's final catas- 
trophe, the climax of which was reached with amazing rapid- 
ity. In the first months of 1812 Napoleon had reached the 
pinnacle of power. ~e was the autocratic ruler-either directly- 
or through his viceroys, governor-generals, or absolutely obedi- 
ent vassals--over a territory commencing from the Niemen and 
induding Danzig, Hamburg and Amsterdam, right' up to ' 
Madrid, Calabria and Illyria. 
His mere word was enough to dethrone any king ox to wipe 
off the map any state on the continent of Europe. He could 
quarter troops wherever he desired and keep them there as 
long as he pleased. There were only two powers in Europe 
who were independent of him-England in the extreme'west, 
and Russia in the extreme East. But Napoleon was confident 
that, having conquered the continent, he would be able to 
subdue these countries too. . 
In the spring of 181 1 Napoleon received in his palace in 
the Tuileries the Bavarian General von Brede. In the course of 
conversation this general diffidently and respectfully expressed 
the opinion that it .would be unwise to pick a quarrel with 
Russia and attack her. Napoleon with a peremptory gesture 
interrupted the general and said in-a sharp and emphatic tone: 
"Within three years from now I shall be ruler of the world!" 
But within three years the greatest empire that had existed 
since the time of Alexander the Great was a heap of. ruins. . . . 
In the opinion of military experts, in these East years-years 
of frightful, sanguinary struggle-Napoleon often displayed 
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the- same supreme perfection in the art of war that he had 
shown in his numerous earlier &mpaigns. This was the case, 
for example, in a8 13-14. The forces at his command a t  the 
beginning of \this final struggle were far larger than he had 
commandeil on any previous occasion. Consequently, the col- 
lapse of this colossus must have been due to far deeper cause$ 
than the loss of a particular battle, or even of a whole 
campaign. 
In -the' course of Napoleon's career an extremely important 
change occurred-symptoms of which were visible long before 
his d6bAcle-which made that catastrophe inevitable. Unless 
this factor is understood, every attempt to explain the collapse 
of Napoleon's Empire will amount to no more than the repeti- 
tion of the innimerable mystical, romantic iiid idealistic fan- 
tasies with which the history of his reign is already so replete. 
Napoleon was indomitable and every:attempt to resist him 
ended with 'the defeat of his adversary. But this was true as 
Wi 
long & he & ~ e d  as tlie "surgedn of 'history"-accelerating the 
@ operatibn of'~historically progressive pririciples and destroying " by fire and sword the obsolete 'and 'doomed feudal system in 
EUT~. I t  was &is period when ~ a ~ o l e o n  ,was crushing and 
s~ee~in '~ ' , away  the feudal-aristoq.atic and 'absolutist man- 
archi&'of Eiuope that Marx and Engels had in mind when 
they A d  that. in a certain sense the Napoleonic Wars. did for 
the continent oE Europe what the guillotine. had done in 
France during the Reign of  error. European feudal absolu- 
tism could never recover from the fnihtful b1ovs that Napo- 
% ..L.. icon dealt it; 'and i n  the countries that he had knquered the 
1 sympathies -of all prdgressive people-sometimes concealed and sometimes unambigu.ously expressed-were undoubtedly on 
- the side of the conqueror. 
: symptoms of these changes had been visible for a long time. 
After Austerlitz its banefui effects were felt in the Germanic 
countries, in Belgium, Holland and ltaiy; and they were 
: seen even by those who in 1804 saw nothing prejudicial in 
, -  Napoleon assuming the title of Emperor, and who believed 
that the role of liberator of nations could be played even by 
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- one who wore the royal purple. But after the Peace Bf Tihit 
- all illusions on this s-me had to-be 2 5 d d .  
Napoleon 'began openly to advan'ce the principle &at he 
had been applying for a considerable time past. The fatal 
flaw in this was that it drew a distinction between 
France, or the "old departments," as it was called, and the 
rest of conquered ~ u r o ~ e ,  which was called the "new de- 
partments." According to this principle the French were the 
privileged, ruling race, and they alone were to enjoy to the 
full all the benefits and privileges gained by the victorious 
sword of the Emperor. The other nations of Europe were des- 
tined to be the vassals of France. 
Although designating himself "Emperor of the West" and 
aspiring to become the ruler of the world, Napoleon never- 
theless deliberately played the part of a French national sover- 
eign, daiming the right to rob all his other subjects in the 
interests of the French. "For'me the interests of the nation 
are supreme," he said, meaning by that the interests of the 
French bourgeoisie, for whom Germany, Italy, Spain, Holland, 
Belgium, the Germanic couniries, the Duchy of Poland, etc., 
were to serve primarily as markets and sources of raw ma- 
terials. He deliberately ruined the countries which were likely 
to become competitors of France; and he openly stated that 
the French deserved special protection not only because they 
were the most "loyal" of his innumerable subjects, but also 
because they were a superior race. 
He expressed these opinions with his characteristic blunt- 
ness and candor because he was absolutely convinced of the 
idallability of his fundamental principles. For example, in 
estimating his losses in battle, he considered that the only 
casualties worth considering were those suffered by the French 
units of his multi-national armies. This is what he said about 
the Grand Army that perished in the snows in Russia: "In 
Russia our losses were extremely heavy, but not as heavy as 
many suppose. The Imperial had-barely 140,000 ~re i ch -  
speaking men, and the campaign of 1812 cost old France 
proper only 50,000 men." ' 0 
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H e  emphasized the same point in his famous conversation 
with Prince Metternich in Dresden on June 28, 1813, when 
he refused to conclude peace with the Allies. He admitted in 
that conversation that among those who perished in 1812 
-"were loo,ooo of the finest soldiers of France." "These I am 
really sorry for," he said: "As for the rest, they were only 
Italians, Poles and, above all, Germans!" And he pronounced 
the word "Germans" with a contemptuous grimace. 
"Granted," answered Metternich, "but Your Majesty will 
agree that this is not the argument to use when speaking to a 
German." 
Napoleon oppressed economically and ruined the European 
nations he had conquered not only by means of his continental 
blockade, but by other stern measures which he imposed upon 
them in the economic field to prevent them from developing 
their independent economic life. For example, he prohibited 
the introduction of modern technical improvements in the 
conquered countries; he ordered that all stocks of raw silk be 
exported from Italy for the use of the silk weavers of Lyons, 
leaving for the Italian silk weavers only what surplus the 
French did riot need. He deliberately prohibited the building 
of roads essential for commerce, and ordered that thousands 
of Merino sheep be 'driven from Spain into France, thus de- 
priving the Spanish cloth weavers of fine wool. In the 
"ideological" sphere, so to speak, he did not hesitate to assert 
at every opportunity that it 'was the birthright of the French 
to rule over the rest of mankind. 
After the Peace of Tilsit, when the border-line between 
the permissible and impermissible rapidly began to lose all 
significance for him, Napoleon no longer confronted the peo- 
ples of Europe-and the progressive class that the bourgeoisie 
represented at' that time-as a liberator, but as a cruel tyrant 
who divided mankind into lords and slaves, placing in the 
first category the French alone and condemning the rest of 
mankind to the second. He began to be regarded as a ruth- 
less despot who deliberately ruined the countries unfortunate 
enough to come under his heel; and it became the dream of 
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the whole of progressive mankind to rid the world of this 
tyrant* 
The desvuction of the Grand Army was intimately con- 
nected with the change that took place in Napoleon's historic 
activities, and is therefore a matter of supreme interest from 
the point of view of the subject we are discussing. In the first 
years of Napoleon's reign his army was invincible. But to 
the extent that it absorbed elements that were alien to the 
French its spirit changed; its monolithic compactness and 
unit$ which had made it such a powerful instrument in the 
hands of its leader, relaxed. Thus, Napoleon's army began to 
lose its invincibility long before 181n. 
But in that year, reckless of the consequences, he drove 
into Russia not only soldiers from the multi-racial popula- 
tions of subjugated Europe but also spaniardsn from the 
Pyrenees peninsula, which he had invaded. The Spanish peo- 
ple had by no means been subjugated and continued to offer 
fierce and uninterrupted resistance to the conqueror. To fight 
on behalf of an alien cause, on behalf of a tyrant who was 
oppressing and ruining one's native land, and knowing that 
every new victory he achieved only served to rivet the chains 
of slavery still more firmly on his victims, was more than 
human nature could stand. , 
This had a fatal effect upon Napoleon's army, and the signs 
of its1 disintegration were visible to all who had eyes to see. 
Striking evidence of this was seen during the battle of Leip- 
zig, when, at the height of the battle, the Saxons, who had 
been forcibly driven into the fight, went over to the side of 
Napoleon's enemies, turned their guns on the French and 
shot them down at short range. 
Thus, the invincibility of Napoleon's army disappeared 
when he abandoned the historically progressive mission that 
he had been fulfilling, when the halo of warrior against feudal 
reaction had faded from his brow, and when he began to use 
the unlimited power he had acquired in the pursuit not only 
of reactionary but utterly impossible aims-to transform the 
French into a ruling nation and all other nations into dumb 
60 
beasts of burden. This utter contempt for the material in- 
terests and. human dignity of the conquered nations, this sepa- 
- 
ration of the peoples into sheep and goats, into a race of 
lords and a race of slaves, served to disintegrate the army just 
as it disintegrated the foundations of the great political edi- 
fice that Napoleon had erected. 
One of the numerous factors that caused Napoleon to un- 
dertake the invasion of Russia was the dimming of his for- 
merly brilliant political mind. This had become evident from 
the moment he came under the spell of the illusion that 
France was destined to rule all the nations of the globe and 
that it was his "mission" to organize and lead this ruling 
French race. What is Russia? A country, like all other coun- 
tries, destined to be subjugated. If she dares to claim the 
right to pursue an independent policy, it only shows that "she 
is challenging fate." This was the idea that he had expressed 
on more than one occasion even before he expounded it i ~ t  
his proclamation announcing his invasion of Russia. 
' 
Napoleon put before the nations of Europe the alterna- 
tive of either abandoning all thought of Europe ever being 
,free from alien conquerors, or of into a life-and- 
death struggle to overthrow the despot, and to prove that all 
the talk about the mission of the French race to rule the world 
was merely political delirium. Europe toqk the latter course, 
and it fell to the lot of the Russian people to bear the brunt 
of this great struggle. It was Russia that first dispelled the- 
myth, so leng prevailing, that Napoleon's army was invin- 
cible. 
On June 24, 1812, Napoleon, the greatest soldier the world 
had ever seen, crossed into Russian territory, and this, as 
Talleyrand expressed it, marked "the beginning of the end" 
of his rule in Europe. 
On June 22, igqi, the miserable adventurer Hitler, dream- 
ing of becoming a Napoleon, hurled his armies across'the fron- 
tiers of the Soviet Union. But this perfidious and malicious 
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enemy miscalculated his own strength and the strength of 
the Soviet people. Accustomed to easy victories over 'unarmedA 
nations, or over armies that had been betrayed by their gov- 
ernments and generals, and knowing no other victories, he 
thought he would have a walkover in the knavish adventure 
he had undertaken. But at the first impact with the might 
of the Red -4nny. he learned that at last he had met his 
master. . \ 
The starvation in his country is even greater than the most 
barren parts of Napoleon's vast empire ever experienced. In 
the army, which still obeys him-in fear of death-in every regi- 
ment and every company of even the most nationally "pure" 
army corps and division, class hatred and strife reign to a 
degree that Napoleon's Grand Army never knew. 
The case of Napoleon proves t d  us that even the greatest 
military leader is powerless and doomed when he sets out to 
achieve the absolutely impossible aim-inspired exclusively 
by krude political egoism-of becoming the ruler of the world 
and of ruthlessly exploiting his own and subjugate& peoples. 
Today it has a-gain fallen to the lot of the great Russian 
people to liberate ;Europe, this time from a far more cruel, 
despicable and shameful yoke than she had borne before. 
As Joseph Stalin said in his famous broadcast of July g, 
1941, on the scorched earth: 
"This war. with fascist Germany cannot be considered an 
ordinary war. It is not only a war between two armies, it is 
a130 a great war of the entire Soviet people against the German 
fascist armies. 
"The aim of this national war in defense of our country 
against .the fascist oppressors is not only elimination of the 
danger hanging over. our country, but also to aid all the 
European peoples groaning under the yoke of Germa~ fascism. 
"In this war of liberation we shall not be alone. In. this 
great war we shall have loyal allies in the peoples of Europe 
and America, including the German people, who are enslaved 
by the Hitlerite despots. 
"Our war for the freedom of our country will merge with 
6s 
the samggh of the peoples af Europe and America for their 
independence, for d ~ o ~ t i c  libemes. 
"It will be a united front of the peoples standing for free- 
dom and against enslavement . . and threats of enslavement by . 
Hitler's fascist armies." * ' 
r mankind the beginning of the end is already 
e Russian people. today are displaying the same 
a101 courage and self-sacrifice in the moment of danger as they 
displayed at the time when Napoleon was forced to admit that 
the Russian soldiers were braver than any he had had to con- 
tend against before. But how much other conditions have 
the technical equipment of the armed forces of the 
is in no way inferior to that of the invading 
enemy, and in many respects is far superior. Basing itself on 
the experience of all the great wars and battles in history, in- 
in the present European war, the Red Army 
crushing blows on the arrogant foe. The myth 
army is "invincible" has been dispelled. As Stalin 
said in the broadcast: 
"History shows that there are no invincible armies and never 
- have been. Napoleon's army was considered invincible but it 
: was beaten successively by Russian, English and German. ' armies." As for ~itler'fi German fascist army, "this army had 
not yet met with serious resistance on the continent of ~ u r o ~ e .  
Only on our territory has it met serious resistance. And if, as 
a result of this resistance, the finest divisions of Hitler's Ger- 
man fascist army have been defeated by our Red Army, it 
means that this army too can be smashed and will be smashed 
as were the armies of Napoleon and Wilhelm. . . . The men of 
the Red Army are displaying unexampled valor. Our resis- 
tance to the enemy is growing in strength and power. 
"Side by side with the Red Army, the entire Soviet people 
are rising indefense of our native land."** 
The despicable criminals, who, as the renowned German 
author Heinrich Mann has said, have exceeded all bounds of 
human baseness, will not succeed in enslaving the eoo,ooo,ooo 
free citizens of the Soviet Union. As ~ o l o t o i  said on behalf 
of the Soviet people: "Ours is a just cause. The enemy willbe 
mshed. Victory will be. ours!" , .  - 


